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GROUP-CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO
RECONCILIATION
ERIN ANN O’HARA*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years a number of scholars in a variety of intellectual
disciplines have contributed to a better understanding of dyadic conflicts and
their resolution. In particular, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists,
lawyers, and others have explored the dynamics of apology and its role in
1
deescalating disputes and promoting forgiveness and reconciliation.
Furthermore, we have a better understanding today of the benefits to
individuals from forgiveness and reconciliation. Victims who are able to forgive
their transgressors have better psychological and physical health and lead richer
lives.2 Because lawyers tend to focus their attentions on legal disputes, a
growing body of legal scholarship attempts to apply these insights to help
promote apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in courts and alternative
dispute-resolution fora.3 This scholarship has in turn provoked a debate among

Copyright © 2009 by Erin Ann O’Hara.
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1. The literature on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation is vast and growing. Some very useful
articles, books, and book chapters include NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF
APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 26 (1991); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to
Transgressions: Effects of the Actor’s Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353
(1989); Robert D. Enright & Bruce A. Kittle, Forgiveness in Psychology and Law: The Meeting of
Moral Development and Restorative Justice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1623 (2000); Letitia Hickson,
The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 283
(1986); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121
(2002); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000);
Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281 (1991); Elizabeth
Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV.
289 (2001); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997).
2. See Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
303, 315 & n.42 (noting possible health benefits from forgiveness); Frans B.M. de Wall, Evolutionary
Ethics, Aggression, and Violence: Lessons from Primate Research, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18 (2004)
(noting that some studies indicate that forgiveness produces health benefits).
3. See, e.g., law-review articles cited supra note 1.
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legal scholars regarding the proper use of apology and apology-promoting tools
in the context of legal disputes.4
The early legal scholarship in this field focused on dyadic disputes. More
recently, however, legal scholars have applied the interdisciplinary insights to
group conflicts. In the area of apology, for example, one legal scholar has relied
on interdisciplinary insights to advocate court-ordered apologies as a civil-rights
remedy in cases of civil-rights violations committed against groups of
individuals.5 Similar insights were used to explore the role of apology for
helping to resolve international conflicts between states.6 One author uses these
insights to advocate that corporations apologize for product defects and
accidents that cause public harm.7 And another scholar has used the insights to
argue that the American Bar Association should apologize and make
reparations for its prior exclusion of African American lawyers.8 Although this
development is exciting (after all, who wouldn’t like to see group conflicts and
civil unrest avoided), most legal scholars have failed to think carefully about
potential differences between dyadic and group conflicts and their resolution.
To what extent can insights from apology and forgiveness in dyadic disputes be
imported into the group-conflict context? How might differences between the
two types of disputes necessitate differing dispute-resolution techniques? And
specifically, how is disputant resistance to conflict resolution changed or
amplified in the group-conflict context? A group of legal scholars at Vanderbilt
Law School, affiliated with the Law and Human Behavior Program, wanted to
bring together an interdisciplinary group of scholars whose expertise lies in and
around conflict resolution to explore this question.
We partnered with the Andrus Family Fund, which generously provided us
with the necessary funding to host this conference. The Andrus Family Fund
has provided funding to a number of conflict-resolution practitioners who have
played important roles in promoting peace, reconciliation, and problem
resolution to groups around the world.9 Some of the techniques used by the
Fund grantees are adapted from the work of William Bridges,10 who developed

4. For example, compare Taft, supra note 1 (arguing that apology should play no role in law or it
will be used strategically), with Cohen, supra note 1 (arguing that legal reforms should be put in place
to promote apology by wrongdoers).
5. Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006).
6. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
433 (2006).
7. Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, DISP. RES. J., May–July 2002, at 26.
8. Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro, Truth Matters: A Call for the American Bar Association to Acknowledge
Its Past and Make Reparations to African Descendents, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 51 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Andrus Family Fund, Community Reconciliation Grantees, http://www.affund.org/
Community_Reconciliation.html (last visited July 31, 2009).
10. Andrus Family Fund, Transitions: Sustaining Social Change, http://www.transitionandsocial
change.org/links.html (last visited July 31, 2009).
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a conceptual framework for how people transition to changes that affect their
lives in important ways.11
The Bridges framework treats transitions in three phases. External changes
often require internal psychological transitions, which involve “(1) an ending,
(2) a neutral zone, and (3) a new beginning.”12 In the ending phase, the
individual struggles to accept the end of an old way of being. Our connections
to people and places, jobs, activities, ways of being, and attitudes help to define
us, and the loss of any of these connections can cause not just mourning for the
loss of that connection but also a kind of crisis of identity. Endings thus can be
painful even when the change is desired.13 According to Bridges, ending
experiences typically involve disengagement, dismantling, disidentification,
disenchantment, and disorientation.14 In the neutral zone, the individual feels
confused and anxious, because she does not yet know her new state of being.
But in this stage the individual is able to be very creative and to conceive many
possibilities for future courses of action.15 In the ending phase the individual
adopts her new course of action or sense of self, or both, and reintegrates her
new identity with the enduring elements of her old identity.16 Transitions are
often aided by rituals set in place to mark the phases of transition and their
significance to the individual.17 The Andrus Family Fund believes that conflicts
throughout the world are often caused by or take on their own difficulties in
responding to transition. Understanding the Transitions Framework and its
implications for dealing with difficulties can significantly aid the process of
promoting peace and reconciliation.
In addition to providing the conference funding, the Andrus Family Fund
was able to provide us with a connection to successful conflict-resolution
practitioners who had thought a lot about the relationship between transition
and conflict-resolution theory and practice. At the same time, the Fund was
equally interested in the question of the extent to which work on individuals can
be translated to the group-conflict context. Andrus Family Fund President
Steve Kelban noted privately at the conference that the Fund had always
proceeded under the assumption that learning about individuals could be
applied to groups. But to what extent is this so, and how, if at all, should legal
and social policies take into account differences?
Of course, this is a huge question that cannot be resolved in a single
conference. Many of the participants were addressing the question only

11.
2004).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See generally WILLIAM BRIDGES, TRANSITIONS: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE’S CHANGES (2d ed.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 109–23.
See id. at 133–55.
See id. at 169–74.
See id. at 101–05.
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indirectly, and, like any good conference, we crafted as many questions and
disagreements as we did seeds of understanding. Even so, conceptual progress
was made at the conference, and the product of the individual scholars’ and
practitioners’ thinking is provided in this issue. Before describing the basic
thesis of each of the articles in this issue, let me elaborate on some of the
insights regarding group-conflict resolution that were identified at the
conference.
II
WHAT WE LEARNED
First, many of the insights applicable to dyadic conflicts are also useful for
group conflicts. Whether involving dyads or groups, conflicts involve humans
who are experiencing predictable and powerful emotions. A wrongdoer,
whether acting as individual or as part of a group, might resist acknowledging
wrongdoing if (as is often the case) that acknowledgment produces feelings of
shame and vulnerability. A victim, whether suffering as individual or as part of
a group, can significantly benefit from apology, and apologies can set the stage
for productive discussions regarding reparations and reconciliation. In all
conflicts, regardless of type, reconciliation is easier after unintentional rather
than intentional harms, and after minor rather than major harms. Timing of
apology is critically important in both dyadic and group conflicts, as are the
words chosen and the body language, tone of voice, and other details of the
apologetic gesture. In both contexts effective apology can reduce the reparation
demands, and enduring reconciliation is more likely when the victim is able to
forgive.
The group nature of conflicts complicates the conflict-resolution process,
however. When individuals behave in a group frame, emotional biases,
heuristics, and other tendencies that favor in-group members and disfavor outgroup members are much more likely to be present. Among other effects, these
tendencies can result in individuals selectively attending to stimuli, assimilating
information in a biased manner, and selectively remembering facts and events
surrounding the conflict.18 Each of these factors can complicate dispute
resolution. In addition, these tendencies can profoundly shape one’s attitude
toward another, and in this case can cause fear, distrust, and hostility toward
out-group members,19 making resistance to conflict resolution stronger in the
context of group conflicts. When one experiences conflict with in-group
members, feelings of distrust and hostility can sometimes be overcome by an
offsetting need to preserve the benefits of an ongoing relationship, but no such
18. Roger Conner & Patricia Jordan, Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry: Barriers to Apology by
Leaders in Group Conflicts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (Spring 2009).
19. Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, A Biological Approach to Understanding Resistance
to Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Group Conflict, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Spring
2009).
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pressure toward reconciliation is present when conflict involves out-group
members.20 Moreover, group leaders know that loyalty to the group enhances
the group’s cause, especially against powerful opponents, and group loyalty is
facilitated through polarization, which is achieved by dehumanizing, blaming,
and resenting opponents.21
Authors Doug Yarn and Greg Jones suggest that out-group hostilities, or at
least the differential assessment of in-group and out-group members, are
biologically based.22 Terry Maroney notes that the idea is supported by
psychological experiments showing that “both [blacks and whites] . . . acquire[]
a stronger anticipatory fear response to [racial] out-group than to in-group
faces, and both [groups] show[] a resistance to fear extinction only for outgroup faces.”23 If these biases are biologically based, then that suggests group
conflicts might be even more resistant to reconciliation than are dyadic
conflicts.
Group conflicts and their resolution often involve public statements made
on behalf of a group or directed toward another group. Public statements are
dangerous mechanisms by which to attempt to air disagreements because, as
Susan Bandes points out in the context of victim impact statements, such
statements are very often ritualized and unnatural, and third-party victims and
others often are unable to respond in a meaningful way.24 Moreover, any speech
act that must cross racial, ethnic, or class boundaries (which is more likely for
conflict with an out-group) risks misinterpretation by the communication’s
target.25
Even without these tendencies toward bias, hostility, and misinterpretation,
group conflicts can be harder to resolve because each individual in a group must
follow her own psychological journey through blame, anger (or guilt),
acceptance, and, finally, peace. Several of the Andrus Family Fund grantees at
the conference spoke of conflict resolution within William Bridges’ Transitions
Framework. Recall that when one confronts change, such as a new job, divorce,
personal tragedy, victimization, or cessation of hostilities, one must travel
through three psychological stages: endings, neutral zone, and new beginnings.26
In the endings stage, an individual feels a sense of loss for an old way of being.
Even if the old way of being was painful or otherwise problematic, it often was
familiar and contained known rules of conduct that facilitated a sense of
20. Id.
21. Meghan Clarke, Polarization: The Role of Emotions in Reconciliation Efforts, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (Spring 2009).
22. Yarn & Jones, supra note 19.
23. Terry A. Maroney, Unlearning Fear of Out-Group Others, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83
(Spring 2009).
24. Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Spring 2009).
25. See id. (discussing the misinterpretation problem in the context of victim impact statements).
26. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
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comfort. The end point of the process, “new beginning,” is a state of comfort
with the new state of being. But in between, in the neutral zone, lies anxiety and
insecurity and a feeling of chaos from the uncertainty surrounding that new
state. The neutral zone can be full of excitement and creativity because it
involves rewriting history and forming a new identity. In the context of conflict,
this stage also requires the individual to interact with people that she might
prefer to avoid.27
An individual’s progress through these three stages might depend on any
number of factors, including the personality and disposition of the individual,
whether the individual is a direct or indirect victim or perpetrator,28 the
influence of family members and of others in one’s close social groups, and the
standing of the individual within these social groups. Some individuals involved
in group conflict might be eager to take early steps toward conflict resolution,
whereas others might take months or years longer to be ready to work toward
resolution. Reluctant members of the group can call on group identity to try to
discourage resolution efforts by more-eager group members. Dyadic-conflict
resolution also can be hampered by the individuals’ relationships and alliances
with third parties who have their own strong views about the nature of the
conflict and its appropriate resolution. Ken Downes provides the example of
the sibling who wishes to forgive her brother but is reluctant to take that step
given the anger and resentment expressed by her other siblings.29 But these
problems are much more severe in the context of group conflicts, in which it is
much less clear who in the group does and should own the right to forgive or to
cease hostilities.
Individuals are also differently situated with regard to their cognitive
sophistication regarding the conflict, which means that it is challenging to
provide effective communication regarding conflict resolution. Individuals with
high cognitive sophistication are much more likely to pay attention to these
communications, but their views tend to be highly resistant to change.30 The
views of those with less cognitive sophistication are more malleable, but these
individuals are less likely to be attending to communications.31
The complicated dynamics of group conflicts suggest that they might well be
harder to resolve than dyadic conflicts. Many of these complications can be
overcome, however, with effective leadership and sensible conflict-resolution
procedures. The key for resolving all conflicts is to promote mutual
understanding. Each side needs to see why the other side cares passionately
27. Clarke, supra note 21.
28. In this issue, Susan Bandes points out in the context of criminal wrongdoing that direct and
indirect victims are very differently situated. See Bandes, supra note 24.
29. Rev. Dr. Kenneth R. Downes, A Reflection and Response to Using Criminal Punishment to
Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Spring 2009).
30. James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (Spring 2009).
31. Id.
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about the issue.32 Because group leaders can strongly influence group members’
attitudes, they are essential to promoting a sense of understanding.33 Effective
leaders will sense an opportunity to promote attitude change and can use
apology or other reconciliation gestures to invite the opposing group to enter
into a new relationship.34 Roger Conner and Patricia Jordan point out that
apology in the context of a group conflict can be effective if (1) the timing is
right in the sense that negative attitudes have been softened, (2) there is a
window of opportunity that provides a leader with the ability to confine the
subject of the apology to a manageable scope, and (3) symbolic communication
is used to help strengthen the perceived significance of the apology.35 This third
factor is especially important in the context of group conflicts. To promote a
harmonious sense of appropriate timing for conflict resolution, the individuals
in the group may need social markers to guide them through the psychological
transition, and ceremonies and rituals help to acknowledge endings and new
beginnings.36 Symbolic gestures, including statues and plaques, also aid healing
and provide a sense of reparation in situations in which multiple individuals
suffer from wrongdoing.37
Brent White points out that leaders might apologize less frequently than
would be ideal because they are worried about losing face, and that anxiety can
promote defensive behaviors, including denial, minimization, and mental
disengagement.38 That sense of face threat can be greater in the context of group
conflicts because by definition a group will observe the apology. On the other
hand, if the face threat is perceived as a threat to the group rather than to its
leader, then it might be relatively easy for the leader to apologize on behalf of
the group.
Group conflicts can involve multiple perpetrators and multiple wrongs that
can have the effect of defining one or both groups in problematic ways. In these
cases, mechanisms must be designed to address both the individual and the
broader harms and to provide a symbolic mechanism for the groups to move
forward with new identities, or at least with a new relationship. As Meir DanCohen describes the challenge, the goal is to facilitate the loss of collective
memory (in which personal identities are tangled up in the wrong) while
retaining a collective history (a more impersonal narrative) of the wrong.39
32. Clarke, supra note 21.
33. Steven D. Martin, Encountering and Countering Tribal Conflict with Film and Dialogue, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (Spring 2009).
34. See Conner & Jordan, supra note 18.
35. Id.
36. Downes, supra note 29.
37. See Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 261 (Spring 2009).
38. Id.
39. Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of States, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 95 (Spring 2009).
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In the aftermath of widespread wrongs, individuals are sometimes brought
to justice using criminal tribunals. The tribunals have the advantage of holding
wrongdoers accountable, but often they are used to prosecute one or a few and
highlight the victimization of only one or a few.40 In other cases, truth and
reconciliation commissions (TRCs) are set up to better understand the
wrongdoing. TRCs typically provide an opportunity for all victims and
perpetrators to come forward, but they do so by providing amnesty to those
who testify, and so accountability is dampened. As Laurel Fletcher notes,
differing groups within a society might differ in their preferences for criminal
tribunals or TRCs, and good choices will depend on context, the cultural
environment, and the timing of redress.41 As the conflicts in the Balkans,
Rwanda, and Uganda show, identity groups and local politics strongly influence
people’s reactions to these reconciliation choices. Nevertheless, both of these
reconciliation mechanisms can promote peaceful coexistence while helping a
society to create an official history about the past.
Jill Williams cautions, however, that at some point TRCs can create a
tension between truth and reconciling a community.42 For example, TRCs are
set up to enable victims and perpetrators to come forward and testify about
their activities and experiences. Ideally, a collective history would consist of an
aggregation of the individual recollections of past wrongdoing. But James
Gibson expresses his conviction that in order to be truly successful in promoting
group-conflict resolution, a TRC must focus on the needs of the larger society
rather than on those of the individual perpetrators and victims.43 Diminishing
the focus on individuals works better in situations in which, as in South Africa,
relatively few gross human-rights violations occurred and most people
aggrieved do not perceive themselves to have been specifically victimized.
Regardless of perceived focus, TRCs cannot ignore those directly affected by
conflict, however, because direct victim buy-in is often needed to achieve social
reconciliation and to ensure that future recommendations are implemented.44
When societies are cleaved by ethnic or social conflict, effective
reconciliation is much more likely if the individual members of each of the
groups involved in the conflict also feel loyalty to the superordinate group. This
loyalty can be engendered in situations in which the larger group is held

40. See Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B.L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional
Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work
Together, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 91, 95–96 (2007) (noting that international criminal
tribunals cannot alone accomplish justice because they try only a few cases involving the gravest
crimes).
41. Laurel E. Fletcher, Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A Comment on Challenges
to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (Spring 2009).
42. Jill E. Williams, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of a Grassroots Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Spring 2009).
43. Gibson, supra note 30.
44. Williams, supra note 42.
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together by a common history, ethnicity, and religious and social values.45 As
Tom Tyler points out, superordinate-group loyalty in very diverse societies can
be promoted alternatively with procedural justice in general and with regard to
the conflict at issue.46 Tyler describes procedural justice as including (1) the
opportunity to state one’s case to authorities, (2) neutral decisionmaking, (3)
treatment by authorities with dignity and respect, and (4) apparently
trustworthy behavior on the part of the authorities. Fair procedures help to
build stronger group identity, and they enhance the legitimacy of the authority
of the superordinate group. In Tyler’s view, loyalty to the larger group that is
not otherwise glued together will depend on both identification and legitimacy.
If this loyalty can be engendered, then individuals will react relationally to the
decisions of the larger group, meaning that they will accept and comply with
those decisions simply because the decisions further the concerns of the group.
If not, then individuals will react instrumentally to the group’s decisions,
meaning that they will accept and comply with the group’s decisions only when
the decisions favor their own self-interest. It is much easier to resolve conflicts
when individuals are thinking relationally rather than instrumentally about their
relationship to the superordinate group.
Some but not all group conflicts turn violent. At first blush, it might seem
that violent conflicts are much harder to resolve, because they are more likely
to involve atrocities that seem unforgivable, and presumably they are often very
difficult to resolve. But group conflicts that manage to stay nonviolent typically
involve groups that are separated geographically, socially, and governmentally
and involve disagreements with low stakes that in particular do not threaten the
core identity of any of the involved groups.47 As Bob Mnookin and Alain
Verbeke point out, sometimes the very factors that keep group conflicts from
escalating into violence also work to minimize the prospects for reconciliation.48
When the stakes are relatively low and the groups are not forced to coexist at a
fundamental level, each side can afford to insist on adherence to its own
position, and mutual goals do not create pressure for compromise.
As this introduction indicates, much of the intellectual collaboration
contained in this conference and this issue focused on identifying the special
challenges of group conflicts and on exploring a variety of mechanisms that can
be used to help overcome those challenges. In reaction to this overexuberance,
some conference participants expressed a concern that group conflicts might
implicate special ethical issues that counsel against pressing too hard for

45. See Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (Spring 2009).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No
Reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Spring 2009).
48. Id.
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reconciliation.49 Group-conflict resolution can run the risk of disempowering
individual victims when community leaders take ownership of the victim’s
grievance and her power to forgive (or not) her perpetrator. Thomas Brudholm
and Valérie Rosoux point out that when leaders, in their zeal to promote
community reconciliation, place undue pressure on direct victims to forgive
wrongdoing, especially atrocities, those victims can be left feeling lonely,
abandoned, shameful, fearful, distrusting, and confused.50 And Frank Dukes
argues that it sometimes makes sense to respect the difference between solving
problems and healing relationships.51 In some cases the goals of group-conflict
resolution should be truth, understanding, and reparations rather than apology
and forgiveness. Dukes worries that in some cases forgiveness can be
problematic when it has the symbolic effect of mitigating a wrong. These
concerns could and sometimes should influence both the timing and the
ultimate goals of conflict-resolution efforts.
Some of the articles and comments in this issue explore conflict resolution
issues peculiar to the criminal-justice system. Criminal wrongs involve dyadic
conflict in that they typically involve actions taken by a perpetrator against a
victim. But crimes are defined and treated in litigation as wrongs perpetrated
against the state, and in this sense one side of the dispute involves a group
(community). When a wrong harms both an individual victim and a group
(society), it is difficult for a single process to effectively serve the needs of both.
This was an instinct expressed by James Gibson in his discussion of TRCs, when
he took the position that a TRC should function ultimately to serve the needs of
the larger community rather than those of the individual victims.52 The modern
criminal-justice system seems to take a similar stance toward criminal cases in
that they serve the needs of the state (the prosecutor) rather than the
preferences of the victim (who is not a direct party to a criminal case). Victim–
offender mediation (VOM), sometimes used as a substitute for criminal
prosecution, does a better job of serving the victim’s needs but it fails to address
social needs. As Maria Mayo Robbins and I argue, the two dispute-resolution
mechanisms, VOM and criminal trials, can work together to more effectively
serve the needs of both groups.53 John Haley pushes even harder for criminaljustice reform by arguing that Japanese-style restorative justice—which involves

49. E.g., Thomas Brudholm & Valérie Rosoux, The Unforgiving: Reflections on the Resistance to
Forgiveness After Atrocity, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Spring 2009); E. Franklin Dukes, Truth,
Understanding, and Repair, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (Spring 2009).
50. Brudholm & Rosoux, supra note 49.
51. Dukes, supra note 49.
52. Gibson, supra note 30.
53. Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria Mayo Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim
and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (Spring 2009).
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mediation by victim, offender, and community representatives—might do an
even better job simultaneously serving victim and social needs.54
III
ARTICLES AND COMMENTS: WHAT WE WROTE
The eight articles and their accompanying comments were roughly grouped
into eight topics of discussion at the conference: (1) perspectives on
polarization, (2) unrightable wrongs?, (3) natural-science insights into conflicts
and their resolution, (4) philosophical perspectives on conflict and
transformation, (5) transitioning toward coexistence, (6) reconciling nonviolent
conflicts, (7) the power of apology, and (8) overcoming resistance to conflict
resolution. A brief description of the thesis of each of the papers is provided
below.
A. Perspectives on Polarization
In Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, Susan Bandes
discusses the polarizing function of victim impact statements (statements by
victims or family members about the effect of the crime on their lives) used in
the context of the death penalty.55 The use of victim impact statements is
justified in order to promote “closure” for the victim, but it is unclear what
psychological closure can be accomplished from the formal litigation process.
Even if victim impact statements do help their authors, in the context of the
death penalty the authors are family members of the victim, not the direct
victim, and Bandes questions whether it is important to further their interests at
the expense of the interests of the defendant. In any event, victim impact
statements are necessarily highly scripted and highly impersonal, and they
provide no ability for listeners to respond to the authors’ anguish in a
meaningful way. The only recourse for the jury is to deliver a sentence of death,
so the statements have the effect of polarizing the conflict in ways that Bandes
thinks interfere with promoting justice.
Meghan Clarke, in her comment Polarization: The Role of Emotions in
Reconciliation Efforts, points out some strategies that have been used in the
Collaborative Change Approach to group-conflict resolution that are designed
to help depolarize the competing sides’ stances toward one another.56 In order
to try to break down the hostility between the groups, Clarke and others bring
together each identity or stakeholder group in order to share with one another
why each group cares passionately about the issue. Understanding one
another’s values and motivations will not resolve the conflict, but it does tend to

54. John O. Haley, Comment on Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social
Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Spring 2009).
55. Bandes, supra note 24.
56. Clarke, supra note 21.
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help aid depolarization. Clarke provides the example of a groundfishery conflict
that involved recreational fishermen, commercial fishermen, environmentalists,
researchers, and government officials. The interests of each of these groups
conflicted, but no group had morally problematic motivations or values, and it
aided discussions to make that clear at the outset. These meetings can be
difficult to achieve if hostile attitudes have already set in, because sometimes
group resentment is so strong that one group does not want to legitimate
another group by letting it participate in discussions. But the resulting
depolarization is often critical to constructive resolution of the problem.
B. Unrightable Wrongs?
This panel explored the question whether it always makes sense for thirdparty advocates to fight hard for depolarization, conflict resolution, and
forgiveness. In The Unforgiving: Reflections on the Resistance to Forgiveness
After Atrocity, Thomas Brudholm and Valérie Rosoux question the ethics of
having religious and political leaders call on individual victims to forgive
wrongdoing as an aid to group-conflict resolution.57 Even though a group might
strongly desire political stability and peace, Brudholm and Rosoux argue that
these goals should not be obtained at the expense of the needs of the victim. In
addition, Brudholm and Rosoux argue that the future is not per se more
important than is the past. And, even when the group strongly desires
reconciliation, reconciliation does not necessarily require forgiveness. The
authors argue that “the intimate experience and personal pace of each [victim
and] survivor” should be respected in the process of attempting to build a
peace.58
Laurel Fletcher, in Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A
Comment on Challenges to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation,
challenges the current consensus in the international community that criminal
tribunals are the best mechanism for rebuilding society.59 To Fletcher, it is not
clear that a legal response—in the form of a criminal tribunal or TRC—is either
necessary or desirable for reconciling group conflicts. In the end, Fletcher
thinks that the appropriate role of the law depends critically on the situation,
including the cultural identities involved and the timing of the response, and
that the international community should rethink its rush to aid conflict
resolution with tribunals and TRCs.
In Truth, Understanding, and Repair, Frank Dukes explains that his work as
an environmental advocate and mediator often focuses on environmental
problems that can be characterized as “unrightable wrongs.”60 In these cases, the
wrongs involve past injustices that
57.
58.
59.
60.

Brudholm & Rosoux, supra note 49.
Id. at 48.
Fletcher, supra note 41.
Dukes, supra note 49.

Spring 2009]

GROUP-CONFLICT RESOLUTION

xiii

(1) were systematically or intentionally inflicted upon a . . . group, often seemingly
motivated by prejudice or discrimination;
(2) have historic, present, and future consequences;
(3) have come to involve a . . . complex set of issues and stakeholders [complicating
resolution]; [and]
(4) have spiritual, moral, emotional, social, economic, and political aspects and
61
implications.

In these situations Dukes focuses primarily on addressing ongoing
environmental problems and hazards rather than on mending the relationship.
Dukes acknowledges that he does focus on helping to build resilient and
sustainable communities, but he also insists that productive resolution of some
problems can happen in spite of, even because of, the lack of full reconciliation,
including forgiveness, in social relationships.
C. Natural-Science Insights into Conflicts and Their Resolution
This panel explored the extent to which behavioral biology and
neuroscience can help us to understand interpersonal conflicts and the
dynamics of conflict resolution. In A Biological Approach to Understanding
Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Group Conflict,
Douglas Yarn and Gregory Jones note that conflicts between members of an ingroup can be impeded by psychological resistance to apology and forgiveness,
but that the problems associated with resolving conflict are exacerbated when
the conflict extends to out-groups or out-group members.62 When conflict
involves someone from an out-group, there is much less need to preserve the
benefits of cooperation. In addition, as Yarn and Jones describe, we tend to
show more fear, distrust, and hostility to out-group members than we do to ingroup members. Yarn and Jones argue that these reactions are evolutionarily
adaptive but that they nevertheless serve as impediments to group-conflict
resolution that are not necessarily present in dyadic conflicts.
In Unlearning Fear of Out-Group Others, Terry Maroney describes a
neuroscientific fear-extinction study as preliminary evidence supporting the
notion that out-group hostilities might be influenced by biological
predispositions.63 In the fear-extinction study, subjects were conditioned to fear
the presentation of black or white faces with the introduction of an electric
shock when such faces appeared on a screen. Then the experimenters stopped
using the shock when that race’s faces appeared on the screen. Subjects’ fear
was extinguished much more effectively when the subject was conditioned to
fear faces of individuals of her own race than when the subject was conditioned
to fear faces of individuals of another race.

61. Id. at 58 (numbers and internal punctuation added).
62. Yarn & Jones, supra note 19.
63. Maroney, supra note 23.
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Steven Martin, in Encountering and Countering Tribal Conflict with Film
and Dialogue, explores the ability of group leaders to overcome resistance to
reconciliation in group conflicts, whether innate or otherwise.64 Martin uses an
example of a group conflict that occurred across religious lines with the pending
release of a movie titled Theologians Under Hitler. Even if out-group biases
make group conflicts harder to resolve, offsetting that complication might be a
predisposition to attend to the views of a respected leader of the in-group.
D. Philosophical Perspectives on Conflict and Transformation
What about the philosophical view of group conflicts? To what extent do
group conflicts differ from individual ones in terms of the normative
implications of conflict? And how do wrongdoers—individuals and groups—get
past their wrongdoing? In Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of States,
Meir Dan-Cohen points out that on the individual level the wrongdoer uses
apology and remorse to try to redefine herself as a person in such a way that
others no longer continue to hold her responsible for her prior bad conduct.65 In
the process of forgiveness, the wrongdoer’s personal identity is redefined in
such a way that the reactive attitudes of the victim terminate. Dan-Cohen posits
that a similar redefinition occurs when the wrongdoing is committed by a
nation. He describes this process as one in which the temporal boundaries of
the state are redrawn. The end result of such boundary drawing is that the
collective memory of the wrong (attached to personal identity) is undone while
the collective history of the wrong (a cognitive recollection that the wrong
happened) is retained.
In Comment on Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries
of States, John Goldberg praises Dan-Cohen’s creative thinking about state
wrongdoing but argues that it is ultimately unclear how a nation gets relieved of
responsibility for its past harms.66 Equally unclear is why as a normative matter
nations should be permitted to obtain temporal shifts. Dyadic conflicts that
redefine the wrongdoer might be easier to envision because the victim is
empowered to redraw the boundary of the wrongdoer. When a nation commits
wrong, the justification for redrawing its boundaries often must come from
somewhere other than a single victim’s forgiveness.
E. Transitioning Toward Coexistence
This panel discussed the use of TRCs to transition away from conflict and
toward peaceful coexistence. In On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of
Truth Commissions, James Gibson uses the example of South Africa’s TRC to

64. Martin, supra note 33.
65. Dan-Cohen, supra note 39.
66. John C.P. Goldberg, Comment on Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries
of States, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (Spring 2009).
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illustrate the factors necessary to help achieve societal change.67 The TRC needs
an ability to attract the attention of constituents, which requires a simple
message containing personal relevance. The TRC needs to be perceived as
legitimate, which requires that it proceed with impartiality and evenhandedness.
If perceived as legitimate, then the TRC will be perceived as a credible source
of information. And information will not help to transform attitudes unless it is
thought to come from a credible source. The challenge to widespread TRC
success, according to Gibson, is that people with low cognitive sophistication
are relatively unwilling to pay attention to the TRC, and those with high
sophistication, while attentive, are highly resistant to attitudinal change.
Jill Williams, in Legitimacy and Effectiveness of a Grassroots Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, provides a slightly different perspective on the
success of TRCs. She describes the TRC process that was put into place in
Greensboro, North Carolina.68 That process was set up to address community
hostilities that had been festering for more than twenty years, since the 1979
killings of black protesters by Ku Klux Klansmen and American Nazis. In that
case a grassroots-initiated TRC was formed to address the community
problems, but it was not backed by the local government and it lacked the
ability to grant amnesty or to subpoena witnesses. Community members had
very different views regarding the necessity and likely helpfulness of the TRC.
Williams concludes that in that case, in which local community leaders did not
play a central supporting and empowering role for the TRC process, truth was
enhanced but reconciliation was not furthered. Without local government buyin, institutional reform was not taken seriously and trust between racial groups
was not enhanced.
F. Reconciling Nonviolent Conflicts
This panel focused on group conflicts that manage not to turn violent and on
the extent to which their resolution differs from that of violent conflicts. In
Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No Reconciliation: The Flemish and
Walloons in Belgium, Robert Mnookin and Alain Verbeke describe the
nonviolent but very serious conflict in Belgium between the Flemish (Dutch) of
the North and the Walloons (French) of the South.69 The Flemish economy is
more prosperous than the Walloon economy, and the Flemish constitute a
majority of the Belgian population. Nevertheless, the Walloons enjoy a
financial subsidy from the Flemish and share equally in the political power of
the nation due to antimajoritarian restrictions built into the government
structure. Even though significant and persistent, this conflict remains
nonviolent due to several factors cited by Mnookin and Verbeke, including
largely separate geography, language, and social structure; a low-stakes conflict;
67. Gibson, supra note 30.
68. Williams, supra note 42.
69. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 47.
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relatively small wealth disparities; a federal system largely enabling separate
political systems; and a pragmatic tradition. In this case, the authors argue that
the disputants can continue to coexist with a civilized separation short of
divorce. They further point out that the very factors that help keep this conflict
nonviolent also serve to provide little incentive to work toward a more
cooperative relationship.
Tom Tyler is not so sanguine about the ability of the Flemish and the
Walloons to continue to coexist under the same government structure.70 In
Governing Pluralistic Societies, he points out that the legitimacy of the Belgian
government is jeopardized because decisions are often made by the elites to the
exclusion of the public. When legitimacy is compromised, Tyler argues, citizens
no longer deal relationally with their government, giving it the benefit of the
doubt on individual decisions. Instead, citizens begin to evaluate government
instrumentally based on their own sense of self-interest regarding each policy
decision. When the citizens deal instrumentally with their government, then the
government is forced to try to deliver benefits to each of the diverse groups of
constituents and the stability of the sociopolitical relationship is threatened.
In Examining the Applicability of the Concepts of Apology, Forgiveness, and
Reconciliation to Multi-Stakeholder, Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes,
Jennifer Pratt Miles discusses her efforts to help reconcile a nonviolent group
conflict in northern New Mexico, where water-quality-improvement issues
divided watershed groups.71 The ingredients of the conflict-resolution efforts
were not drastically different here than they would be in other circumstances,
although perhaps the efforts to resolve nonviolent conflict bear fruit more easily
than they do elsewhere. Specifically, Pratt Miles pointed out that her conflictresolution efforts provided a forum for voice, bearing witness, acknowledging
the history and past injustices regarding land rights, and incorporating language
regarding important social values into the documents symbolizing the resolution
of conflict.
G. The Power of Apology
This panel focused on the ways in which the use of the U.S. criminal-justice
system can conflict with the needs of victims and offenders to come to terms
with wrongs and to heal from emotional harms. In Using Criminal Punishment
to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, Maria Mayo Robbins and I argue that
our current criminal-justice system could do a better job of simultaneously
serving the needs of victims and society.72 Currently, criminal wrongs are treated
as wrongs against the state, and the needs of society are served at the expense of
70. Tyler, supra note 45.
71. Jennifer Pratt Miles, Examining the Applicability of the Concepts of Apology, Forgiveness, and
Reconciliation to Multi-Stakeholder, Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 193 (Spring 2009).
72. O’Hara & Robbins, supra note 53.
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the needs of victims, who are often left feeling frustrated and powerless in the
process. Robbins and I propose to give victims a more direct voice in the timing
of parole by allowing them to make an offender eligible for parole ten to twenty
percent sooner than they would be eligible for parole under governing, default
rules. Victims who have the power to enable early parole could choose to
exercise that power as an act of forgiveness toward the offender, or could
choose not to exercise that power as an act of vengeance; either way the victim
has a way to give effect to her emotional needs. By so empowering the victim,
offenders have an incentive to participate in victim–offender mediation, a
process which has played a significant role in helping victims to heal after
crimes by promoting understanding, apology, and forgiveness.
John Haley, in Comment on Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both
Victim and Social Needs, argues for even stronger reform of the U.S. criminaljustice system.73 Haley advocates the adoption of a restorative-justice model
similar to the one employed in Japan, and he argues that the restorative-justice
model has proven successful given Japan’s much lower crime and recidivism
rates. Haley argues that as a normative matter an offender who accepts
responsibility for her actions, shows remorse, and offers reparations should be
reintegrated into the community in socially and economically meaningful ways.
In A Reflection and Response to Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both
Victim and Social Needs, Kenneth Downes expresses his support for increased
victim–offender mediation.74 VOM serves as a quasi-ceremonial process that
creates a safe space for enabling victims to “restore[] [their own] status and
voice” and for enabling “the work of apology, forgiveness, and
reconciliation . . . [to] begin.”75 Downes cautions, however, that policy changes
will require buy-in from prosecutors, judges, and others in the criminal-justice
process. These participants all have powerfully formed professional identities,
and they may therefore need their own group-transition process for VOM to be
successful.
H. Overcoming Resistance to Conflict Resolution
The final conference panel focused on gaining a greater understanding of
the role of leaders in either contributing to or helping to resolve group conflicts.
In Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry: Barriers to Apology by Leaders in
Group Conflicts, Roger Conner and Patricia Jordan point out that, at least in
theory, leaders can reap great reputational benefits by successfully diffusing
group conflict with apology, and yet leaders very rarely offer apologies, either
on their own behalf or on behalf of the groups they lead.76 Conner and Jordan
seek to understand why this apologetic behavior gets hindered, and they find
73.
74.
75.
76.
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three explanations: (1) in many group conflicts, leaders believe that the fault
lies with the other group(s); (2) leaders or their groups, or both, might privately
acknowledge wrongdoing but be unwilling to endure the psychological
transitions required to change their identities and their behavior; and (3)
apology can be politically risky for the leader. Despite these impediments,
leaders do sometimes issue public apologies for wrongdoing. Conner and
Jordan argue that for apology on behalf of a group to be effective, the necessary
ingredients include (1) ripeness, (2) a window of opportunity (that bounds the
scope of responsibility), and (3) a symbolic communication for moving forward
beyond the mere words of the apology.
In Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, Brent White adds to
the list of factors that can hinder apology by leaders.77 He focuses on factors of a
dispute that tend to trigger feelings of shame on the part of the leader, because
shame can hinder a leader from standing tall and stepping forward to take
responsibility. White argues that apology is less likely when the conduct that
constitutes the wrong is especially blameworthy, when the conduct is harshly
reproached by the victim, and when the events at issue have already been
thrown into the public domain. Perhaps for separate reasons, White argues that
leaders are less likely to apologize when the victim is of low status. In these
circumstances, White argues that court-ordered forced apologies may be
necessary to overcome the barriers.
Alphonse Gerhardstein, in Can Effective Apology Emerge Through
Litigation?, provides a number of examples in which the factors identified by
Conner and Jordan—ripeness, a window of opportunity, and a symbolic act or
gesture—came together to facilitate apology by a public leader.78 But
Gerhardstein does not think that the window of opportunity needs to be
exogenously determined. Rather, advocates can, through litigation and
settlement demands, create that window. Furthermore, Gerhardstein believes
that apology by public officials can do more to promote a healthy civic society
than can mere monetary settlement.
IV
CONCLUSION
Scholars from several fields have concluded that group conflicts are in many
ways similar to dyadic conflicts but that group conflicts present their own
challenges for effective resolution. Group conflicts often require formal
processes, from public hearings to TRCs to criminal tribunals, and they often
require the intervention of third-party professionals. But leaders and advocates
can play an important role in preparing the members of the group to transition

77. White, supra note 37.
78. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Can Effective Apology Emerge Through Litigation?, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (Spring 2009).
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from conflict back to peace. The articles and comments in this issue contribute
in important ways to our understanding of the problem, but they represent only
the beginning of a rich inquiry. Much more can be learned about these
dynamics and the role (or lack thereof) of law and legal processes in helping to
promote conflict resolution.

